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Social Needs, Social Goods, and Human Associations in the Second 
Edition of Carl Menger’s Principles 
 
Abstract: This paper deals with the contents of the second edition of Carl Menger’s 
Principles of Economics (1923), which was neither reprinted in German by Hayek in 1934 nor 
translated into English by Knight in 1950.  The aim of this paper is to show that a new 
Mengerian economic agent can be found in the contents of Chapter I, where Menger dealt 
with social needs and social goods. I consider this specific contribution of the latest Menger a 
natural development of his methodological research on the nature of institutions. Finally, I 
contextualize the story of the missed reprint and translation in the debate about the meaning of 
economics involving Hayek and Robbins at the LSE and Knight in Chicago. 
Introduction 
Menger worked on revisions of the first edition of Principles (Menger 1871) for the last 
twenty years of his life, and never authorized a reprint or translation1. 
Karl explained that his father had long intended to revise and extend the first edition.  
Although he did not change the general meaning of his previous book, he added some 
                                            
1
 This paper is mainly based on Menger's archive, held at Duke University (where Menger's Papers 
contain notes and drafts of the second editions), as well as Menger Library, hosted at Hitotsubashi 
University (which houses Menger’s personal copy of the first edition of his Principles with his notes 
and marginalia). Menger Papers includes both father and son's personal archives. Menger’s archives 
arrived at Duke in 1988 as a donation from Eve Menger (Karl’s daughter), and the first inventory of its 
content was published in 1990 (Barnett, 1990). Drafts of the second edition of Menger’s Principles are 
held in boxes 5-13 (out of 26). Boxes 5, 6 and 7 hold the drafts of the new parts of the second edition: 
Chapter I (1903-1907) and Chapter IV (1906-1907). Menger's almost 20,000 volume personal library 
was sold to Hitotsubashi University by his wife a year after his death.  Marginalia are present in many 
of these volumes, and more details about the history of the acquisition of Menger’s collection can be 
found at http://chssl.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/menger/index.html. 
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‘relevant parts’, and  made some minor adjustments to the central and final chapters (on value, 
exchange, price and money2). 
If we compare the two editions, the ‘relevant parts’ mentioned by the editor are Chapter I (on 
human needs), and the second half of Chapter IV (on the two meaning of ‘economic’3). 
According to the editor, Menger’s intense work on the revision of his Principles was mainly 
due to his dissatisfaction with the definition of a human need he gave in the first edition. In 
the second edition, Menger reformulated the first prerequisite of an economic good as 
follows: no longer simply “a human need”, but “the perception or the anticipation of a human 
need” (Menger 1923, 11). As Menger himself wrote in his notes, a new chapter on human 
needs was to come before the chapter on goods, because the nature of goods cannot be wholly 
understood without a deeper understanding of the nature of human needs.  
1. Menger’s shift from individual needs to social needs  
 
In the first edition, Menger wrote that an economic good requires four prerequisites: 
the presence of a human need; some properties able to render a thing capable of 
being brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need; the human 
knowledge of this causal connection, a command of the thing sufficient to direct it to 
the satisfaction of the need.  In the second edition, Menger reformulates the first 
prerequisite of an economic good as follows: no longer simply “a human need”, but 
                                            
2 The first scholar who studied the relationship between Carl Menger’s archive and the making of his 
Principles was Yagi (Yagi,1993), who described the genesis of Menger’s first edition (1871). For a  
detailed story about the relation between the published edition of Menger’s Principles and his notes 
and marginalia, see also Yagi’s essay at http://chssl.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/menger/essay1.html. 
3 In order to avoid any possible suspicion that the editor had been changing or manipulating the 
original version, it is important to underline that draft materials of the second edition of Menger’s 
Principles actually match the published second edition.   
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“the perception or the anticipation of a human need” (Menger 1923, 11), and  defined 
a human need as “the starting point of any economic inquiry” [p.1]. 
He also clearly claimed that the human economy can be studied from two different 
perspectives: a subjective one (based on the economic behavior of individual agents 
and their needs), and a collective one (based on the economic behavior of social 
groups and their needs). According to Menger, the latter wasn’t adequately explained  
[p.7]: not only is an exact definition of individual needs important, but also 
fundamental to a complete definition of economy is a deep understanding of the 
nature of social needs4. 
Menger wrote: “being a need perceived by an agent, the nature of human economy 
can be fully understood only when there is a complete definition of any possible 
economic agent”. On developing this specific point, Menger introduced the existence 
of a new economic agent. He called it ‘human associations’: “societies, associations, 
corporations, communities, and the State, of the national or global economy”5 [p.7]. In 
order to explain the nature of this new economic agent (more complex than a single 
individual or a sum of individuals), Menger introduced three different social needs 
that require three different social goods to be satisfied.  
 
                                            
4 This passage from an individual perspective to a national (or collective) one was a common feature 
in the traditional German economic literature. Austrian scholars –with some important exceptions 
(Caldwell 2003; Vaughn 1994), consider Menger a strong opponent to German political economy. 
Nevertheless, recent studies also based on Menger’s notes show a different story and reveal the 
strength of the influence of the German Historical School. 
5 In German:  "Gesellschaften, Genossenschaften, Korporationen, Gemeinden, Staat, Volks- und 
Weltwirtschaft”. 
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The general definition of an economic good is to be a means to satisfy a human 
need. Social goods are particular economic goods able to satisfy social needs. 
Usually, a social group is simply defined as the sum of its individual components; in 
this case it is possible to apply the mechanisms of individual behavior to social 
dynamics.  
Nevertheless, there are situations in which social groups are more than the sum of 
their parts, and the analogy between individual behavior and groups dynamics no 
longer work appropriately.  
To explain this passage, Menger introduced: a) common needs, b) collective needs, 
and c) needs of human associations. As a logical consequence, three different social 
goods are required for their satisfaction: a) common goods, b) collective goods, and 
c) goods of human associations [p.7]6. 
a. Common needs are shared by many individuals. They might be satisfied by 
each of them in a separate way (to give an example, Menger suggested the 
drawing of drinking water by separate house wells or jointly by a single well 
(e.g. owned by a monopolist)) [p.7]. The source (demand) of these common 
needs is still individual; the supply of common goods to satisfy them can be 
provided either by individual agents in a competitive market form, or by a 
producer in a monopoly. 
b. Collective needs arise when individuals, who share the same common need, 
require a delegate agency able to provide a common good demanded by the 
community as a whole. They correspond to the modern meaning of “public 
                                            
6 The following examples used to illustrate different kinds of social needs are provided by Menger 
himself. 
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goods”7. ‘Private transport facilities and private schools’ are examples used by 
Menger [p.8]. In this case, the demand still comes from individuals, more 
precisely from the sum of all individuals who are part of the same social group. 
The supply of collective goods requires a producer who can’t be the individual 
or the social group (again, the market form does not matter). This is the 
difference between common goods (a) and collective goods (b). In this case, 
Menger is still maintaining his original individualistic approach. 
c. Needs of human associations are shared by individuals who are voluntarily 
linked in a particular association, able to provide goods required by the 
members of that association, in order to satisfy not a common or a collective 
need, but a need of the human association as a whole [p.9]. They are different 
from (a) and (b) because, in this case, a non-individual demand exists and 
goes beyond the sum of individuals’ demand. The consumer is no longer a 
single individual or the sum of singles; the consumer is a ‘human association’. 
Examples provided by Menger about this new economic agent as a consumer 
are institutions (‘Institutionen’) like the State and the Municipality (‘der Staat’, 
‘die Gemeinde’). As soon as they emerge, they assume an independent life 
(‘ein selbständiges Leben’). They are no longer just means (‘Mittel’) to satisfy 
common or collective needs; they are subjects with their own personality 
(‘Eigene Persönlichkeit’), following their own purposes (‘Eigene Zwecke’) [p. 
9].  
                                            
7 Usually, the origin of the term in German economic literature is traced back to Adolph Wagner’s 
“Gemeinbedürfnisse” (Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie, 1892), and Emil Sax’s notion of 
Kollektivbedürfnisse. As corroborated by books in Menger’s library, Wagner was a very influential 
author for Menger. 
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It is important to note that in this passage Menger is dealing with the role of human 
associations as long as they assume the nature of a new economic agent able to 
demand. He is not dealing explicitly with a generic economic policy of the State.  
His endorsement of a possible active role of the State was previously presented in 
his Lectures to the Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria. According to Menger, the State 
should promote public goods (such as public transportation) and help some sectors 
that need to be supported, as well as regulate some intervention to preserve natural 
resources and to stop any possible form of exploitation of workers, children in 
particular   (Menger 1994, 123-129).  
As Menger wrote: “in all of the cases above, the state shall actively intervene in the 
economic life of its citizens. Such intervention spells neither paternalism nor the 
exercise of control and thus a handicap, but wholesome protection and the 
representation and support of the community for the greatest happiness of the whole 
and its parts”. And he continued: “there is still another kind of useful intervention, 
namely when the state interferes powerfully with the economic activities of certain 
individuals in order to protect the community against their detrimental schemings” 
(Menger 1994, 125). 
2.  A new economic agent: the human associations 
Human associations as new economic agents who demand an economic good to 
satisfy a human need can be regarded as a shift from a strict individualism to a more 
complex approach to the nature of economic agents. This shift in Menger’s thought 
can also be regarded as a natural consequence of the concept of institutions he had 
introduced in his methodological research (Menger 1883). Institutions, like human 
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associations, spontaneously emerge as a natural development of common human 
life, and as a natural effect of the process of feedback among and between 
individuals and their environment. Human associations (not reducible to a sum of 
individuals) can be intended as consumers: the different nature of a human 
association and the mere sum of individuals within a social group is not merely 
quantitative, but qualitative.  
From a methodological point of view, Menger had been shifting from a pure and strict 
individualism to a more complex perspective, based on the idea that when a human 
association emerges it acquires its own personality; becoming an economic agent not 
only able to supply (basically to provide collective goods), but also to demand, 
because social needs of type (c) emerge as well. This doesn’t mean that Menger 
rejected individualism: individualism still performs human need of type a) and b). 
There is a general agreement among Austrian scholars: Menger was the founder of 
methodological individualism, or subjectivism in economics. This is mainly due to the 
well-known Methodenstreit between Menger and Schmoller (focused on the 
contraposition between individualism versus holism as well as the possible existence 
of exact laws in economics), and to Hayek’s introduction of Menger’s thought to the 
English speaking world on the occasion of the publication of the German edition of 
Menger’s Complete Works (Hayek 1934).   
The idea of a sharp division between Menger and the German Historical School is 
still the dominant point of view among historians of economic thought. As some 
authors already noticed (Yagi 1993, Ikeda 1995, Ikeda 2008), it was Hayek who 
overemphasized Menger’s aversion to the German Historical School in order to 
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underline the importance of individualism in his methodological approach. This 
aspect is not recognized enough, at least within the Austrian secondary literature. 
The Methodenstreit was overrated, not per se, but in Menger’s thought.  The struggle 
between Menger and Schmoller was mainly a personal issue between the two 
colleagues, and in the 1890s Schmoller even revised some aspects of his position 
against Menger. More importantly, the influence of Roscher had been quite central in 
Menger’s first edition of his Principles (Menger dedicated his work to him).  
Reading the second edition, the “German influence” on Menger seems to be even 
stronger: the introduction of human associations, in some way, bridged the gap 
between Mengerian individualism and German holism. Some authors already 
underlined the presence of both individualism and “holism” in Menger’s 
methodological approach (Krabbe 1988; Shearmur 1990) as well as some important 
differences between Menger’s organicism and Hayek’s pure subjectivism (Garrouste 
1994).  Some others recognize the essential role of the State concerning the 
emergence and the evolution of money (Hodgson 2001, Ikeda 2008). More recently, 
Richard Wagner has introduced a neo-Mengerian approach, based on Menger’s 
vision of society as a complex network not reducible to some average or 
representative individuals (Wagner 2010). Yagi had also explored Menger’s 
methodological individualism in terms of a possible new view of social evolution (Yagi 
2011).   
The authors quoted above – Yagi excepted -  did not consider the second edition 
however. A possible new interpretation of Menger based on his latest contribution, will 
open a different way of re-thinking the nature of social needs and goods as well as 
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the nature of “human associations” (like the State) as economic agents inside the 
tradition of liberal thinkers. 
3. The misfortune of Menger’s final work.  
As Hayek recalled in the 1920s, the first edition of Menger’s Principles (1871) had 
become a great rarity, and libraries had run out of it years before. In spite of this, his 
work was popular among students of economics. Paradoxically, they were introduced 
to Menger’s thought and to the history of economics by Othmar Spann’s textbook8: 
“his little textbook on the history of economics [Die Haupttheorien der 
Volkwirtschaftslehere] , reputedly modeled on Menger’s lectures on the subject, was 
for most of us [students] the first introduction to this field”  (Hayek 1992, p. 23).  As 
Hayek wrote, Spann (not Mises) first introduced the logic of the means/ends 
relationship: “he had some helpful things to say on the logic of means-ends 
relationship but soon moved into region of philosophy which to most of us seemed to 
have little to do with economics” (Hayek 1992, pp. 22-23).  
Mises had been isolating himself from other Viennese colleagues mainly because of 
his intransigent liberalism and his struggle against socialism (Chaloupek 1990, Hayek 
1992, Boettke 2001, Caldwell 2007).  He was on better terms with colleagues at the 
London School of Economics (Edwin Canann and Theodor Gregory, to name just 
two) and with Viennese young students who joined him in his Privatseminar (like 
Hayek himself).   
                                            
8 In 1919, Othmar Spam was appointed professor of political economy at the University of Vienna 
where he taught until Nazi persecution rose in 1938. 
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When the second edition of Menger’s Principles was published in 1923, it was almost 
unexpected and, in a certain sense,  regarded as unnecessary9. As mentioned 
before, it was never republished in German, nor translated into English.  
To understand the reason of such an unfortunate fate, we have to consider the story 
of Menger’s Renaissance (that took place few years later in London) and  Knight’s 
decision to translate it into English in 1950. The role of Hayek was determinant in 
both situations.  
 
4. Menger’s Reinassance at the LSE  
As is well-known, in the early 1930's Hayek went to the LSE at Mises’ suggestion. He 
joined the newly appointed professor Lionel Robbins, and they became close friends 
(Howson 2013). Once Hayek moved to London they started a challenging new 
project: the building up of a microeconomic theory based on a strict methodological 
individualism and the notion of scarcity.  
The most important result of this project was the publication of Robbins’ book in 1932 
where he rejected the conception of economics as the study of the causes of material 
wealth, and defined economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses“ (Robbins 
1932, 15). Robbins himself quoted Menger and Mises (together with Strigl, Fetter, 
and Mayer) as the main sources of that definition of economics. Not by chance, other 
references of Menger’s thought inside his book are on the subjective theory of value 
                                            
9 Among  reviewers, F. Weiss doubted the accuracy of the editor’s work (Weiss 1924); J. Bonar 
insisted on a new formulation of “capital’ as provision for future wants (Bonar, 1924); G. Del Vecchio 
blamed the fact that Menger did not introduced some objective element to define the value as Marshall 
did (Del Vecchio, 1924). 
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in the first edition of Menger’s Principles (Robbins 1932, 56), and on Menger’s 
struggle against the holism of the German historicism tradition (Robbins 1932, 96).  
Robbins was very influenced by Mises and Hayek while working on his book 
(Howson 2011, 210).  On the other side, both Mises and Hayek were so deeply 
satisfied by the book that Mises used it in his seminar in Vienna, where Robbins was 
invited to give some lectures (Howson 2011, 232).   
In such a framework we have to think about the re-publication of Menger’s works, 
supported by the LSE, under Hayek’s supervision. Menger’s Collected Works 
appeared in German as the first  work of Reprints of Scarce Tracts in Economic and 
Political Science of the London School of Economics.  On that occasion, Hayek wrote 
a well-known introduction (Hayek 1934) that appeared also separately in Economica, 
the review of the LSE (Robbins had joined the editorial board of Economica  in 1929).  
Hayek’s article is a long and exhaustive presentation of Menger’s economic theory 
and methodology for an English-speaking audience.  
This part of the story is crucial. Robbins and Hayek, possibly influenced by Mises, 
had the same intent: the definition of economics as a science of subjective choice 
under some conditions of scarcity (means, time, and knowledge). They found in 
Menger a formidable forerunner of this approach, and in Mises an important follower. 
Not by chance, in his paper Hayek presented “the work of Professor Mises twenty 
years later, [as] the direct continuation of Menger’s work” (Hayek 1934, 414). 
In telling Menger’s intellectual biography, Hayek presented the contents of the first 
edition of his Principles as a firm ground for a subjective theory of value, exchange, 
price, and money, grounded in the idea of scarcity.  The contents of Menger’s 
methodology (Menger 1883) as well as his pamphlet challenging Schmoller (Menger 
1884), are examples of a strictly individualistic method of analysis.  
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The way Hayek introduced Menger was, in a certain sense, misleading. Hayek had 
been trying to depreciate Menger’s affinities with the German tradition. He presented 
the Methodenstreit  as an occasion for Menger “for an elucidation of the origin and 
character of social institutions” and “his emphasis on the necessity of a strictly 
individualistic or, as he generally says, atomistic method of analysis” (Hayek 1934, 
406). Hayek totally disregarded the influence of the German Historical School on 
Menger.  
Stressing the distance between Menger and the German tradition was very useful to 
reinforce Menger’s role as a founder of marginalism (together with Jevons and 
Walras).  Moreover, in his writings dated in the 1940s, Hayek insisted on similarities 
between Menger and Scottish scholars, mostly by overrating Smith’s influence on 
Menger (Hayek 1948)10.  
As we have seen, Menger introduced human association as a new economic agent 
in the second edition of his Principles. This development in Menger’s thought could 
have been considered misleading and even dangerous for what Hayek and Robbins 
legitimately had in mind. The fact that the second edition appeared posthumously 
gave them the chance to easily discard it.  
Hayek noted that Menger refused to reprint and/or translate the first edition, but he 
postponed the project of a second edition because “other tasks claimed his prior 
attention” (Hayek 1934, 410). Hayek mentioned the second edition, but felt its 
republication would be useless. According to Hayek, there was nothing new in the 
                                            
10 A careful reading of the two editions reveals that Smith’s influence on Menger is not so central: 
Menger often quoted Smith, but usually in order to criticize him. Moreover, Carl Menger’s papers 
feature few notes on Smith compared with Cairnes, Mill, Say, and German thinkers. On a related note, 
among German thinkers who influenced Menger, Gossen is not included: he had a minimal role in 
Menger’s thought (Ikeda 2008). 
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latest Menger; and more importantly, the draft material was too fragmentary and in 
awful disorder.  
Hayek wrote: “an inspection of his manuscript has shown that, at one time, 
considerable parts of the work must have been ready for publication. But even after 
his powers had begun to fail he continued to revise and rearrange the manuscripts to 
such an extent that any attempt to reconstruct this would be a very difficult, if not an 
impossible task. Some of the material dealing with the subject-matter of the 
Grundsätze and partly intended for a new edition of this work, has been incorporated 
by his son in a second edition of this work, published in 1923. Much more, however, 
remains in the form of voluminous but fragmentary and disordered manuscripts, 
which only the prolonged and patient efforts of a very skillful editor could make 
accessible. For the present, at any rate, the results of the work of Menger's later 
years must be regarded as lost” (Hayek 1934, 416).  
The reception of Menger’s Collected Works went to the direction Hayek and Robbins 
had wished. A few years later, scholars and economists considered the introduction 
of subjectivism in economics as Menger’s main role in the history of economics 
(Sweezy 1936; Bloch 1940), and Robbins’ and Hayek’s recent publications were 
regarded as “directly affected by Menger’s methodology” (Sweezy 1936, 724)11. In a 
paper published in 1937, George Stigler praised the LSE's efforts to rediscover 
classics in order to reinforce this approach, and he underlined the importance of 
Menger as the most important theorist of subjective value. Stigler also regretted 
“Menger’s failure to develop generally the method by which the individual maximizes 
his want-satisfaction” (Stigler 1937, 239).   
                                            
11 The author was referring to Robbins’ Essay (1932) and Hayek’s book on Collectivistic Economic 
Planning (1935). 
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The second edition of Menger’s Principles was completely forgotten: Hayek’s and 
Robbins’ choice became unquestionable.  
 
5. Menger at Chicago  
During the following decade, Hayek’s efforts were directed toward clarifying his own 
methodology. Menger (not translated into English yet) was presented as a follower of 
the ‘true individualism’, together with ‘Adam Smith and his school’ and in opposition 
to the ‘false individualism’ based on Descartes’ and Rousseau’s rationalism (Hayek 
1948, 4).   
In 1950, Hayek moved to Chicago, where Frank Knight was leading the Department 
of Economics. The two had met in Vienna twenty years before; once Hayek moved to 
London, he (and Robbins) used Knight’s textbook to explain the theory of price; in 
1947 Knight and Hayek jointly organized the foundation of The Mont Pélerin Society. 
Even though Hayek was never admitted as a Faculty member of the Department of 
Economics in Chicago, Knight regularly attended Hayek’s seminars on liberalism and 
the liberal tradition (Emmett 2011, 60). 
It was likely during this seminars that Knight decided to edit the first translation of 
Menger’s Principles into English. Knight wasn’t an admirer of Menger. In his long 
Introduction, he explicitly regarded Menger’s contribution as theoretically inferior to 
those of Jevons and Walras. Also, he harshly criticized Menger’s adoption of the 
principle of cause and effect as the only possible general explanation to understand 
the nature of an economic choice (i.e. an act to get an economic good able to satisfy 
a human need), (Knight, 1950, 16); and he also considered Menger’s definition of 
cost as a good of higher order as fallacious: “Perhaps the most serious defect in 
Menger’s economic system, if we may so call his position as a whole, is his view of 
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production as a process of converting goods of higher order into goods of lower 
order. This involves a fallacious view of the economic process and in particular of the 
role of time. In the first place, there is in fact no such serial sequence. It would call for 
the existence of good of a supreme or highest order, not produced by higher goods, 
and in the economic meaning there are no such goods.” (Knight, 1950, 25)12. 
Reasons why Knight translated Menger’s should be found in a different scenario. The 
role of Menger in the history of economics is no longer as strictly theoretical as it was 
in London two decades before; it was rather political. Menger was depicted as a 
Founding Father of economic liberalism. 
Knight claimed that Menger’s (and his Austrian followers’) merit was mainly to have 
embedded the new economic theory they proposed (marginalism) within the ideology 
of the free competition, in the only possible political framework (liberalism). Menger 
had been seen as a revolutionary thinker, not just because he brought the subjective-
value theory into the general definition of economics and he had been a “pioneer of 
the modern theory of utility” (Knight, 1950, 10), but because the primacy of 
subjectivism in economic principles considers the act of “economizing” as the only 
possible free choice and liberalism as the only possible free contest.  
As Knight wrote one year later: “economic principles are simply the more general 
implications of the single principle of freedom, individual and social, i.e., free 
association, in a certain sphere of activity. The sphere is that of economizing, i.e., 
conduct in which quantitative means are used to achieve quantitative ends” (Knight 
1951, 7). The primacy of subjectivism has as an immediate consequence the primacy 
of the market: “the perfect market (miscalled perfectly competitive) is unreal but 
                                            
12 In his extreme criticism, Knight did not consider the role of knowledge and errors in Menger’s 
thought   (Caldwell 2003, 22). 
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conceptually necessary. It is the embodiment of complete freedom (…) The freedom 
in question centers in the right of each to be the judge of his own values and of the 
use of his own means to achieve them” (Knight 1951, 8).  
Robbins’ endorsement of Menger’s subjectivism was a matter of theoretical 
foundation of the discipline; Knight’s endorsement was a political and ideological 
choice.  
The English translation of Menger’s Principles brought Karl Polanyi, who was 
teaching at Columbia University at that time, to reconsider Menger’s work as a whole. 
He discovered the second edition of Menger’s Principles and subsequently regarded 
Knight's use of Menger (and by Hayek and Robbins earlier) as an abuse (Polanyi 
1971)13. 
Polanyi’s critique was two part14. 
He blamed Hayek for intentionally refusing to reprint the second edition because of 
Menger's introduction of “the two basic directions of the human economy” (Polanyi 
1971; Cangiani 2006, Becchio 2011) in Chapter IV. The first one is a subjective 
direction, based on the use of goods to satisfy needs (later reformulated by Robbins 
                                            
13 Polanyi didn’t read the German edition of Menger’s second edition when it was published despite 
living in Vienna and attending Mises’ private seminars. (Polanyi and Mendell 1987; 1990). During that 
period, Polanyi and Mises also started a direct discussion on the possibility of planned economy 
between 1922 and 1924 on the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik  (Becchio 2007). Papers 
in Polanyi’s archive at the Butler Library, Columbia University, reveal that he became familiar with 
Menger’s latest book while teaching at the university during the early 1950s. See also Polanyi’s 
typewritten notes “on the translation of Menger’s ‘Grundsätze’” and “on the scarcity definition of 
‘economic’ as presented in Menger’s Grundsätze [1923] and Robbins’ Nature and significance of 
economic science” at Karl Polanyi Archive, Columbia University. 
14 Polanyi’s interpretation of Menger’s second edition of his Principles is very well known among 
scholars interested in Polanyi’s thought, but almost unknown among Austrian scholars, with some 
exceptions (Campagnolo 2009, Shionoya 2012). 
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as the formal aspect of the logic of rational choice later reformulated by Robbins), 
and already present in the first edition. The second direction, added by Menger in the 
second edition, is objective and represents the total amount of goods and labor, 
given by natural and social conditions of a society as a whole [Menger 1923, 60 and 
72-79]15. 
On one side, Hayek’s choice to reprint the first edition did not allow the reader to 
know that Menger had been developing a more complex meaning of ‘economic’; on 
the other side, it implicitly gave a sort of ex ante endorsement of Robbins’ definition 
of ‘economic’ provided by Menger, as the only possible meaning of ‘economic’.  
According to Polanyi, the situation got worse later in Chicago.  
In the first edition, Menger had used the term ‘wirtschaftende’ as a synonym of 
‘ökonomischen’ (to be ‘engaged in economic activity’). Also, his use of 
‘wirtschaftende’ had two meanings  (‘related to the allocation of means  in a context 
of scarcity’, and ‘related to the way of saving resources for any future need’). 
Although a proper translation would have  depended on the context of the sentence, 
only the expression ‘economizing’ (related to scarcity) was adopted, with no further 
distinction. In fact, when the translation was carried on, the English word 
‘economizing’  no longer meant ‘engaged in economic activity’; its meaning was 
restricted to the formal aspect of the rational allocation of scarce resources. 
                                            
15 According to Menger, a complete definition of human economy as a real phenomenon includes both 
the relationship between scarce means and given ends (the subjective side) and the set of ‘material’ 
conditions of the human economic activity, i.e. the whole set of goods (the objective aspect) [Menger 
1923, 60]. 
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In the second edition, Menger was much clearer on this point: he distinguished 
between ‘wirtschaftende’ when he was referring to allocation based on scarcity, and 
‘sparend’ when he was considering how to use resources in the future16. 
Menger clearly stated that both meanings are parts of the general definition of 
‘economy’ (‘Oekonomie’), that is different from ‘economics’ 
(‘Wirtschaftswissenschaften’), the science of economy17. 
Polanyi’s “conspiracy theory” rises some relevant points. He rightly maintained that 
Menger’s main concern in revising his Principles was to give a broader definition of 
‘economic’. This is well known, and drafts of his second edition as well as marginalia 
on his copy of the second edition confirm it.  
Despite this, Polanyi completely misunderstood Menger when he maintained that 
Menger’s aim was to highlight the importance of the objective meaning of economic, 
and to diminish the subjective one18. The objective meaning was not in opposition to 
the subjective one (as Polany seems to suggest); in fact, it is the application of the 
                                            
16 The linguistic conundrum may be solved by identifying and distinguishing the following English 
and German terms: (1) economy = Wirtschaft, (2) economizing = wirtschaftend (also: sparend), (3) 
economic efficiency = Wirtschaftlichkeit, (4) economics = Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Sparend means 
also saving. I owe this clarification to an anonymous referee, to whom I am very grateful.  
17 ‘Wirtschaft’ means the economy in general, that is different from ‘Wirtschaftwissenschaft’ 
(economics as a science). 
18 Polanyi’s interpretation of Menger’s Chapter IV is mostly biased by his personal struggle against the 
formalist tradition in economics and anthropology, which he considered unable “to recognize any 
other form of economy than the one based on market-price mechanism: the self-regulation of the 
market is never questioned, and the economist’s question is reduced to the understanding of how does 
it work” (Polanyi, 1971, 17). Menger did not fight against this subjectivist perspective (quite the 
opposite), but its true he didn’t think this approach was the only possible one. Polanyi is a post-
Weberian who believes that the economy is subsystems of the society as a whole. This is an idea that 
Polanyi inherited from Marx and Weber, which Menger did not share at all. 
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mechanism of choice based on scarcity of goods of higher orders, i.e. to the supply 
side of the market. Menger never rejected the subjective meaning of economic, quite 
the opposite. He was extremely clear on this point.  
Furthermore, Menger’s two directions are both central to his definition of economy: 
scarcity necessitates economizing and the alternative use of needed resources, as 
well as the technical arrangement of the existing resources. The technical direction 
represents the supply side of the economic process, and the economizing direction 
refers (in anachronistic terms) to the demand side19. 
Polanyi’s concern about the wrong translation of ‘wirtschaftend’ is much more 
consistent in the story of a possible manipulation of Menger’s contributions and in the 
bad fate of the latest Menger. 
 
Conclusions 
The followers of the Austrian school have been always aware of the misfortune of the 
second edition of Menger’s Principles; and Hayek’s and Knight’s decisions were 
never questioned. The history of the second edition does not concern the Austrian 
tradition alone, however. 
                                            
19 Yet, the specific meaning of these two directions follows from the two extreme examples provided 
by Menger on p. 78: (1) On the one hand, an economy would be fully determined by the technical 
direction (the objective aspect) if the resources at hand, suitably arranged, would suffice for 
completely satisfying all human needs. In such a situation of affluence the economy would be 
characterized only by its technical  aspect, the task would consist in putting the existing resources to 
alternative uses in such a way that affluence can indeed be accomplished. (2) On the other hand, if the 
resources of an economy were rigidly given (and neither production nor the transfer of resources to 
alternative uses possible), then only the economizing direction (the subjective aspect) would be 
relevant for this economy. In this sense, economizing is the response to scarcity. I own this 
specification to an anonymous referee, to whom I am very grateful. 
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If the missed re-publication, as well as the non-translation into English, are 
contextualized within the debate surrounding the building of the present meaning of 
‘economic’ into the mainstream, they become important for the history of the 
discipline as a whole. 
Menger worked on the second edition to develop the meaning of human needs and 
to present a more complete definition of ‘economic’: this led him to introduce a new 
consumer (the human association, like the State). While he never rejected the formal 
meaning of economics (as Polanyi suggested), the introduction of the needs of the 
human associations (that reconnects him with the German Historical School tradition) 
led him to revise, not reject, his former strict individualism. 
During Menger’s revival, Hayek, Robbins, and Knight were building the subjective 
approach to economics. Their operation implied a strong rejection of any economic 
agent aside from individuals. In different ways, they successfully used Menger as one 
of the Founding Fathers of the formal approach to economics. None of them had any 
interest in showing the more complex methodological approach of the latest Menger. 
Polanyi’s observation about the translation of ‘economic’ into the word ‘economizing’ 
can be implicitly regarded as part of their strategy. Hayek and Robbins as well as 
Stigler and Knight had no interest in another possible way of reading Menger. They 
derived all they needed from the Menger of the first edition: a theoretical base for 
subjectivism and a political endorsement for liberalism.   
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